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The Social Security System
and the Demand for Personal
Annuity and Life Insurance
An Analysis of Japanese
Microdata, 1990 and 1994
Seki Asano
3.1 Introduction
Thet wo most important objectives of the social security system are to
support workers in their retirement and, in the case of unexpected death
(or disability) of the breadwinner, to provide a stable ﬁnancial base for the
surviving family members. The current social security system oﬀers partial
insurance for these risks, but by no means provides customized protection
fori ndividual households. Individual workers must prepare for the risk of
living beyond retirement, and for the risk of unexpected death. They pre-
pare for these risks by allocating their wealth to various assets.
Fore xample, households can adjust their future asset positions by pur-
chasing two types of insurance. Those who want more protection against
living for many years in retirement than the public pension system oﬀers
would purchase a private annuity. Those who want protection for family
members in the event of the breadwinner’s death soon after retirement
would purchase life insurance. The resulting asset allocation would reveal
the relative strengths of these two motives.
This study examines the eﬀects of public pension beneﬁts on Japanese
households’ choice of life insurance versus private annuity. Two waves of
microdata, constituting the Nikkei Radar Survey (RADAR) and obtained
in 1990 and 1994, provide a unique opportunity to observe the eﬀects of
changes in social security beneﬁts, total asset values, and expectations on
households’ asset allocations.
In 1994, at the time of the second-wave survey, the Japanese Diet passed
the Social Security Reform Bill. Its main change from the previous 1985
105system was to shift the starting age of basic pension provision from sixty to
sixty-ﬁve. This reform aﬀected males under age ﬁfty-two (in 1994), whose
beneﬁts were delayed by one to ﬁve years. One focus of this study is to ask
how households reacted to this reform.
Also important to this study are the sharp decline in stock prices and
the falling real estate values that began in early 1990. The average market
value of households’ total assets fell about 40 percent by 1994, according
to the sample shown later in table 3.1. In addition, the Japanese economy
was then in a deep recession; thus the public’s prospects for the future
became less optimistic. I look at three age groups—people in their thirties,
forties, and ﬁfties—to see how households react to these changing eco-
nomic conditions in various stages of their life cycles.
In the past, empirical studies of the eﬀect of public pensions on life
insurance and private annuity purchase yielded varied results. Bernheim
(1991) examined the life insurance and personal annuity holdings of retir-
ees and concluded that pension beneﬁts had a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on
life insurance holdings but depressed personal annuities. Hence, a substan-
tial portion of saving is motivated by bequests. In his analysis, however,
life insurance was measured at total face value, not net of saving. Using
the same data set, Hurd (1989) examined the wealth and consumption
trajectory of retirees and concluded that the bequest motive is weak. Iwa-
motoa nd Furuie (1995, 1996) examined the 1990 RADAR data and found
aw e a ke ﬀecto fb equestable assets on the demand for life insurance. In a
somewhat diﬀerent approach, Chuma (1994) estimated the eﬀect of the
intended bequest motive on the demand for life insurance from the same
1990 RADAR data. He found that there was a signiﬁcant eﬀect for the
younger age group, but not for the older group.
This study diﬀers from previous studies in the following aspects: it looks
at a sample of household heads of working age (thirty to ﬁfty-nine); it
isolates savings in life insurance and personal annuities from gross savings;
and it analyzes two data sets from periods when drastic changes in the
social security system and the Japanese economy were taking place.
In this analysis, I consider market assets (the sum of monetary and real
assets), annuities, and life insurance. Life after retirement is supported by
accumulated market assets and annuities. On the other hand, in the case
of the breadwinner’s death, market assets and life insurance payments will
be bequeathed to the surviving family members.
Annuities consist of both public pensions and personal annuities, and
life insurance consists of both public and private life insurance. In the case
of the insured’s death, the social security system becomes a form of life
insurance. Although it is compulsory to join social security, the level of
beneﬁts provided by the system may not be the same as the individual’s
desired amount: Desired levels of annuities and life insurance vary from
106 Seki Asanoperson to person depending on values, education, life stage, family com-
position, social status, and other factors. Hence, the observed pattern of
holding (private) life insurance and personal annuities can be interpreted
as the result of adjusting the gap between the desired level and the compul-
sory provided beneﬁts of the social security system. Also, because negative
holdings of life insurance and private annuities are practically impossible,
public pensions provide a lower limit for individual annuities and life in-
surance.
If a person has a strong bequest motive, any increase in pension beneﬁts
will be countered by an increase in life insurance. The other side of this
adjustment is a reduction in personal annuities or market assets. If the
person has no bequest motive, increased pension beneﬁts result in a reduc-
tion of personal annuities, leaving the level of life insurance constant.
However, identifying the relative importance of these various motives is
ad i ﬃcult task. Since social security pension beneﬁts are closely tied to
public life insurance coverage, an increase in the former also brings about
an increase in the latter. Private life insurance both provides bequests to
the surviving family (pure bequest), and saving for the insured person.
Most life insurance contracts in Japan serve these two functions, and thus
a substantial portion of them should be regarded as saving (market assets).
My data sets contain unique information enabling the calculation of the
amount of pure life insurance, annuity, and saving (market assets) for both
public and personal insurance/annuity, under plausible assumptions. Us-
ing data on these assets, I estimate a model in which individuals choose
personal annuity and life insurance in order to maximize utility.
Then ext section presents a theoretical model and an econometric speci-
ﬁcation of binding nonnegative choice. Section 3.3 describes the data sets,
and explains some of the variables. Section 3.4 discusses estimation results.
Section 3.5 concludes the paper. The appendix gives a brief description of
the Japanese social security system and of other variables in the paper.
3.2 The Model and Econometric Speciﬁcation
3.2.1 The Model
This model may lead to four types of private annuity and life insurance
holding patterns, based on rational choice of a household:
(private annuity, life insurance) and =+ + + + (,) , (,) , (, ) , (,) . 00 0 0
I assume that the utility of the household depends on marketable wealth
(M), which is the sum of marketable monetary and real wealth including
demand deposits, stocks, bonds, real estate, etc., annuity (A), which is the
annuity and pension received after retirement; and life insurance (L),
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dies. A natural formulation of the choice of these three assets may be the
following expected utility function:
U(M,A,L) PU M A) P)U M L), LB =+ + − + (( ( 1
where P is the individual’s probability of survival to retirement age. UL is
individual utility when one lives to retirement age and holds market assets,
M, and annuities, A. UB is the utility from bequests when the individual
dies before retirement, with the surviving family receiving M and L. This
is the model adopted by Bernheim (1991). However, this formulation leads
to the prediction that nobody holds a personal annuity and life insurance
at the same time. Obviously, that prediction is violated by the data.
In order to avoid such a deﬁciency, I assume that the functional form is
of the linear expenditure system type, written as
(1) U M M A A L L M0 A 0 L 0 =− + − + −   ln( ) ln( ) ln( ).
Marketable wealth (monetary and real assets), M, includes all the ﬁnancial
and real assets that can be bought and sold in the markets. The parame-
ters, M0,A 0,a n dL 0,m ay be interpreted as the minimum level of the three
assets, but such strict interpretation is not necessary. We can assume that
M  A  L  1.
Annuity consists of two components, the ﬁrst provided by the govern-
ment in the form of social security pension beneﬁts, and the second a
personal annuity purchased by the householder. Thus A is written as
(2) A A A PG =+ ,
where AP indicates private annuity and AG indicates public pension.
Life insurance is the conditional payment to the surviving family mem-
bers when the head of household dies. In this sense, the social security
system plays the role of public life insurance. If the recipient of a social
security pension dies, the surviving family members will receive some part
of pension payments for a certain period. Hence, total life insurance is the
sum of private and public life insurance.
(3) L L L PG =+ ,
where LP indicates private life insurance and LG indicates public life in-
surance.
Theh ouseholder will allocate total private wealth to three assets, M,
AP,a n dL P,u n der the wealth constraint.
(4) W M A L PP =+ + al ,
108 Seki Asanowhere a and l are prices of AP and LP,r e s p e c t ively.
Since it is not possible to hold a negative personal annuity (AP)a n dlife
insurance (LP), the ﬁrst-order conditions are the Kuhn-Tucker conditions
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where double inequalities ( 0 )i mply that if the inequality holds on the
left,e q uality holds on the right, and vice versa. Although it is possible to
have negative M, I assume that all households have positive M, i.e., that










Substituting equation (8) into equations (6) and (7) yields
(9) A
ALLM M




























An alternative representation of equations (9) and (10) is obtained by
replacing (M by M  W  aAP  lLP), where W is the total wealth.
(11) A
































Solving equations (11) and (12) for AP and LP,r e s p e c t ively, and adding
disturbance terms uA and uL, the structural form of the personal annuity
and private life insurance demand functions is




























































































Ther ight-hand side of equations (13) and (14) are the latent demand for
AP and LP,b u tthe observed demands for AP and LP aren o nnegative.
When the RHS of equation (13) is negative, AP  0, the same relationship
holds for equation (14) and LP.
I assume that the joint distribution of (uA, uL)i si n dependently and iden-





































The system in equations (13), (14), and (15) is a bivariate simultaneous
Tobit model for which both AP and LP take nonnegative values (AP 	 0,
LP 	 0).
In estimating the model, I have reliable data on LP,L G,A P,a n dA G,b u t
Wi sn o to b s e r v a b l ea n dA 0,L 0,a n dM 0 are unknown parameters. Assum-
ing that W, A0,L 0,a n dM 0 are linear functions of the observables, the
estimable form of the structural equation is
(16) A L , and PL P AA =+ ′ + 
 x u
(17) L A PA P LL =+ ′ + 
 x u ,
where, x is the vector that consists of observed exogenous variables.





















Then, the likelihood function is given by the following:
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where f()i sabivariate normal density function with zero means and the
variance matrix u.T he maximum likelihood estimates of (
A, 
L, A, L,
u)c an be obtained by maximizing equation (18).
3.3 Data
3.3.1 Nikkei Radar Survey
As mentioned earlier, the data sets used in this study are taken from the
two waves (1990 and 1994) of an annual survey conducted by the Data
Bank Bureau of Nihon Keizai Shimbun, called the Nikkei Radar Survey
(RADAR). In RADAR, about 5,000 individuals aged twenty-ﬁve to sixty-
nine were interviewed each year. The observations were collected from the
Tokyoa rea (metropolitan Tokyo, Saitama, Chiba, and Kanagawa prefec-
tures, excluding oﬀshore islands). The response rates were 56.4 percent
(2,818) in 1990 and 54.4 percent (2,721) in 1994. The survey asked detailed
questionsa bout household income: ﬁnancial asset holding patterns, in-
cluding life insurance and private annuities, and various monetary and real
assets. The survey also collected information on each household’s family
background, ages, education, family composition, life stage, and work sta-
tus of husband and wife.
For the econometric analysis, I limited observations to the families of
married couples whose husbands are between the ages of thirty and ﬁfty-
nine and work full time as wage earners. After observations with missing
values or improbable ﬁgures were removed, the sample size was 789 in
1990 and 610 in 1994.
3.3.2 Deﬁnition of Variables
Thef o llowing variables were used in the model.
Variable Name Description Unit
H_AGE Age of husband year
ERN_P Annual permanent earnings of household million yen
RASST Real asset million yen
D_OWN_H Owns home dummy (0,1)
TFASST Total ﬁnancial asset million yen
AP Private annuity million yen
Social Security System, Personal Annuity, and Life Insurance 111LP Private life insurance million yen
AG Public pension million yen
LG Public life insurance million yen
NDEPKID Number of dependent children person
H_CLLG Husband graduated college dummy (0,1)
H_LARG Husband works in large ﬁrm (500 employees) dummy (0,1)
H_PUBS Husband works in public sector dummy (0,1)
W_EMPF Wife works full time dummy (0,1)
Public pension (AG)i sthe sum of public pension beneﬁts beginning at
ages ixty discounted by mortality risk. Mortality risk comes from the 1990
Japanese Population Census, and the discount rate is set at 5 percent. I
also assume that the individual will retire at age sixty.
The life insurance component of public pension (LG)i sdeﬁned as the
expected receipt of a survivor’s pension beneﬁt conditional on the head of
household’s being alive at the time of the survey. I then consider death at
age H_AGE1, H_AGE2, . . . up to age eighty (see appendix).
Of course, the value of LG is related closely to the public pension bene-
ﬁt (AG), because the Employees’ Pension Insurance Survivors’ Beneﬁt
(EPISB) is three fourths of the public pension beneﬁt. The total value of
LG is the sum of EPISB and additional beneﬁts that depend on family
composition and wife’s age and work status.
(Private) life insurance (LP)i sthe expected sum of life insurance cover-
age fromp r i v a t esources.
Net life insurance is the discounted sum of expected life insurance re-
ceipts from life insurance and personal annuities, conditional on the per-
son’sb eing alive at age H_AGE, minus any cancellation value of insurance
contracts (see appendix).
Thev alue of private annuity (AP)i sdeﬁned as the expected value of a
discounted sum of private annuity ﬂow beginning at age sixty. As in the
case of public pension, AP is discounted by mortality risk.
Total ﬁnancial assets (TFASST) is deﬁned as the sum of the usual ﬁ-
nancial assets (such as demand deposits, time deposits, bonds, stocks,
money in trust, and other monetary assets) and the cancellation value of
life insurance and private annuities, minus the present value of home loan
payments. I classify single-payment old age life insurance (ichiji harai yoro
hoken)a saﬁnancial asset instead of life insurance, because it usually has
a short maturity period (ﬁve years) and mostly is purchased as a short-
term saving asset. For this reason I do not include it in the calculation of
life insurance payments to survivors. Its ﬁnancial value is set as the amount
of reimbursement at maturity. Also, variable life insurance (hengaku ho-
ken)i susually purchased as a ﬁnancial asset. Half of its guaranteed mini-
mum life insurance coverage is included in TFASST.
RASST is the sum of the market value of land, condominiums, and
other assets including gold, coins, membership in golf clubs, and the like.
Variable Name Description Unit
112 Seki AsanoIn RADAR, the response to the questions relating to real assets may con-
tain serious errors. The questionnaire ﬁrst asks the value of “own land”
where the owner resides, then asks the value of “other” land and real es-
tate, including condominiums. With this setup, some owners of owner-
occupied condominiums may answer “zero” to both questions, in which
case the value of the RASST is zero even though the respondent owns real
estate. In fact, about 200 homeowners responded in this manner in both
waves. Though I excluded these observations from the sample, other errors
may be contained in this variable. For example, homeowners may report
the value of the land excluding the value of the house. For this reason I dis-
play RASST and TFASST separately in the list of explanatory variables.
3.3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.1 shows the mean values of the variables by age group for 1990
and 1994. As shown, the decline in the real estate market and the stock
market lowered the value of land to about 50 percent of its 1990 level, and
lowered the value of high-risk ﬁnancial assets. Total market assets declined
to about5 0p ercent of their 1990 level for those in their thirties, 66 percent
of their 1990 level for those in their forties, and about 60 percent of the
1990 level for those in their ﬁfties.
The eﬀecto fchanges in the social security system for household portfo-
lios is apparent in the shift in personal annuities. The proportion of AP
holders increased across all age groups: from 19 percent to 33 percent for
those in their thirties, 23 percent to 34 percent for those in their forties,
and 29 percent to 40 percent for those in their ﬁfties. The mean value of
AP,h owever, appearst oh ave stayed about the same.
On the other hand, the proportion of life insurance holders declined by
anywhere from 6 percent to 10 percent across all age groups. Gross life
insurance coverage stayed about the same, but saving from life insurance
fell by 2 million yen (for those in their ﬁfties) and by 0.4 million yen (for
those in their forties). Also, although it is not indicated in the table, all the
annuity holders held life insurance in both waves.
Public pension beneﬁts (AG)d e clined a little for those in their thirties
and forties but stayed the same for those in their ﬁfties. Public life insur-
ance (LG) increased about 10 percent. Thus, in my sample social security
reform, life insurance increased slightly and pension beneﬁt declined.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Structural Form Estimates
Ie stimate the structural form of the model using the maximum likeli-
hood method for individuals in their thirties, forties, and ﬁfties. I use LG
as an instrument for LP in the AP equation, and AG for AP in the LP equa-
tion.T he results are shown in table 3.2.






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Table 3.2 Structural Form Estimate
1990 1994
Structural Structural
Variable Estimate Estimate t-ratio Estimate Estimate t-ratio
Dependent AP (ages 30–39)
LP 0.10 0.10 0.97 0.13 0.04 3.12
CONST 3.17 22.24 0.14 25.35 16.56 1.53
AG 2.03 0.98 2.08 0.44 0.63 0.69
TFASST 0.05 0.14 0.37 0.09 0.11 0.80
RASST 0.01 0.02 0.41 0.05 0.04 1.24
D_OWN_H 3.49 3.06 1.14 0.63 2.12 0.30
ERN_P 3.67 1.83 2.01 0.66 1.31 0.51
NDEPKID 1.07 1.22 0.88 1.43 0.83 1.73
H_AGE 0.33 0.50 0.66 0.52 0.38 1.38
H_CLLG 2.53 2.40 1.05 0.46 1.51 0.30
H_PUBS 6.60 5.69 1.16 7.04 4.34 1.62
H_LARG 0.85 2.46 0.35 1.03 1.69 0.61
W_EMPF 2.74 4.09 0.67 1.71 3.07 0.56
Structural Estimate 10.93 5.53
Dependent LP
AP 0.27 0.75 0.36 2.47 1.10 2.24
CONST 3.07 19.87 0.15 46.97 31.13 1.51
LG 3.09 1.95 1.58 1.60 3.62 0.44
TFASST 0.27 0.12 2.37 0.38 0.23 1.66
RASST 0.02 0.03 0.67 0.06 0.13 0.50
D_OWN_H 2.76 3.97 0.69 0.25 5.91 0.04
ERN_P 5.45 1.94 2.82 2.09 4.09 0.51
NDEPKID 0.45 1.79 0.25 2.07 2.95 0.70
H_AGE 0.35 0.64 0.55 1.76 0.96 1.83
H_CLLG 3.26 3.24 1.01 0.48 5.09 0.09
H_PUBS 2.43 5.69 0.43 5.03 10.45 0.48
H_LARG 1.38 3.26 0.43 3.27 5.05 0.65
W_EMPF 15.65 6.09 2.57 3.06 11.86 0.26
Structural Estimate 23.27 26.61
rho 0.04 0.43
N 275 (,51; 0,182; 0,0  42a) 194 (,60; 0,95; 0,0  39)
Log likelihood 1,373.75 1,043.98
Dependent (ages 40–49)
LP 0.11 0.08 1.37 0.10 0.05 1.96
CONST 39.78 12.77 3.12 1.49 11.23 0.13
AG 0.83 0.45 1.82 0.18 0.33 0.56
TFASST 0.06 0.05 1.20 0.04 0.03 1.05
RASST 0.01 0.01 0.74 0.02 0.02 1.07
D_OWN_H 5.02 2.02 2.49 2.43 1.67 1.46
ERN_P 1.39 0.65 2.14 0.40 0.42 0.94
NDEPKID 1.11 1.07 1.03 0.47 0.75 0.63
H_AGE 0.47 0.28 1.65 0.05 0.24 0.20
H_CLLG 0.35 1.51 0.23 0.39 1.30 0.30
H_PUBS 0.56 2.43 0.23 0.87 2.13 0.41H_LARG 4.85 1.38 3.52 0.96 1.47 0.65
W_EMPF 5.89 1.84 3.20 1.25 1.53 0.82
Structural Estimate 7.07 5.40
Dependent LP
AP 0.01 0.77 0.01 2.18 1.34 1.62
CONST 50.32 20.34 2.47 60.88 27.73 2.20
LG 0.83 0.90 0.93 0.72 0.89 0.80
TFASST 0.27 0.06 4.31 0.14 0.09 1.54
RASST 0.04 0.02 2.32 0.06 0.06 0.95
D_OWN_H 2.14 3.37 0.64 0.29 4.70 0.06
ERN_P 1.38 0.77 1.80 2.54 0.97 2.63
NDEPKID 3.62 1.54 2.35 0.24 2.14 0.11
H_AGE 0.94 0.49 1.94 1.28 0.65 1.98
H_CLLG 3.27 2.79 1.17 0.56 3.67 0.15
H_PUBS 5.81 4.65 1.25 6.33 4.96 1.28
H_LARG 3.44 2.85 1.21 2.04 3.80 0.54
W_EMPF 3.51 3.46 1.01 3.79 4.79 0.79
Structural Estimate 19.49 23.08
rho 0.15 0.33
N 304 (,69; 0,201; 0,0  34a) 225 (,77; 0,115; 0,0  33)
Log likelihood 1,543.97 1,249.60
Dependent (ages 50–59)
LP 0.12 0.09 1.26 0.20 0.06 3.24
CONST 5.22 14.09 0.37 36.37 20.71 1.76
AG 0.19 0.26 0.74 0.08 0.31 0.26
TFASST 0.01 0.04 0.14 0.04 0.05 0.86
RASST 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.02 0.57
D_OWN_H 0.20 1.86 0.11 1.74 2.46 0.71
ERN_P 0.68 0.37 1.84 0.44 0.44 0.99
NDEPKID 0.84 0.83 1.01 1.49 1.01 1.48
H_AGE 0.21 0.25 0.84 0.48 0.39 1.22
H_CLLG 0.19 1.80 0.10 0.53 1.76 0.30
H_PUBS 1.22 2.33 0.52 2.03 2.37 0.86
H_LARG 0.68 1.41 0.48 1.71 1.81 0.95
W_EMPF 0.49 1.97 0.25 0.87 2.67 0.33
Strutural Estimate 5.71 6.59
Dependent LP
AP 0.70 0.98 0.71 1.31 0.61 2.13
CONST 48.84 29.31 1.67 37.34 42.91 0.87
LG 0.16 0.60 0.27 0.81 0.66 1.22
TFASST 0.31 0.06 5.12 0.42 0.08 4.95
RASST 0.00 0.01 0.21 0.01 0.03 0.17
D_OWN_H 2.85 4.87 0.58 11.88 5.38 2.21
ERN_P 0.45 0.66 0.68 0.03 0.84 0.04




Variable Estimate Estimate t-ratio Estimate Estimate t-ratio
(continued)The theoretical model predicts that the coeﬃciento nL P in the AP equa-
tion andtheoneonAPintheLPequationarebothnegative.Contrarytothis
prediction,neithercoeﬃcientcomesoutsi gniﬁcantlynegative,andbothare
positive and signiﬁcant in ﬁve out of twelve instances (three age groups,
two waves, and two dependents). Although the coeﬃcients on AG in the
AP equations and on LG in the LP equations tend to have negative signs as
Ie xpected, they are not signiﬁcant, except in one case (ages thirty to thirty-
nine in 1990). Based on these results, I cannot say that this model speciﬁ-
cation and estimation are correct descriptions of household asset choice.
There are several possible explanations for this result. First, measure-
ment error in AP and LP are unavoidable in this data set, and can cause
bias in estimates. However, this cannot explain consistent positive signs of
endogenous variable coeﬃcients.
Am ore plausible explanation of the positive signs may be that they are
caused by a positive association between AP and LP.T he main reason for
this association may be heterogeneity in time preference. That is, those
whoh aveh i gher time (future) preference tend to have higher AP and LP,
and vice versa. When we can successfully control for time preference by
including variables representing it, we can expect to observe a trade-oﬀ
between life insurance and personal annuity. My results indicate that the
control variables included in the model are not rich enough to explain
heterogeneity in time preference.
3.4.2 Reduced-Form Estimates
Although tight parameterization in theoretical models is not enough to
explain the observed pattern of asset holding, it is interesting to see how
holding private annuities and life insurance is aﬀected by exogenous vari-
ables.
H_AGE 0.86 0.52 1.64 0.90 0.77 1.16
H_CLLG 4.02 2.79 1.44 1.28 4.20 0.30
H_PUBS 1.97 4.31 0.46 3.63 6.02 0.60
H_LARG 6.59 2.79 2.37 3.52 3.85 0.91
W_EMPF 1.08 3.66 0.29 0.98 5.87 0.17
Structural Estimate 16.25 19.93
rho 0.13 0.33
N 210 (,60; 0,124; 0,0  26a) 191 (,76; 0,82; 0,0  33)
Log likelihood 1,067.76 1,054.73
Note: N  Number of observations. See text for explanation of variables.




Variable Estimate Estimate t-ratio Estimate Estimate t-ratio
118 Seki AsanoTo examine how households reacted to a decline in asset values and
reduced pension beneﬁts between the two waves, I estimate tobit regres-
sions of AP and LP foras e to fe x o g e n o u sv a r i a b l e s :L G,A G,T F ASST,
NDEPKID, and other control variables. As in the structural form, the
observations are divided into six groups: three age groups and two waves
(1990 and 1994).
3.4.3 Marginal Eﬀects
Table 3.3 and ﬁgure 3.1 summarize the marginal eﬀects on AP and LP
of public pension (AG), public life insurance (LG), total ﬁnancial asset
(TFASST), number of dependent children (NDEPKID), and intercept
(CONST).
In table 3.3, tests of signiﬁcance of individual coeﬃcients are indicated
in column t,a nd tests of equality of coeﬃcients in 1990 and in 1994 (i90 
i94)a re indicated in column s.E xcept for a few cases, the marginal eﬀects
of these variables change by age group within the same wave. I do not
present results of formal statistical tests, but it is obvious that the marginal
eﬀects change with one’s life stage.
The coeﬃcients of AG in the AP equation are signiﬁcantly negative for
people in their thirties in both 1990 and 1994: 1.247 in 1990 and 0.649
in 1994. This implies that, holding other variables constant, reduction in
public pension beneﬁts is countered by roughly the same amount of in-
crease in private annuities for this age group. In other age groups, the
marginal eﬀects are insigniﬁcant or positive (as for those in their forties
in 1990).
The eﬀects of public life insurance (LG)o np rivate life insurance (LP)
are all negative in 1990 and are signiﬁcant for those in their thirties and
ﬁfties. This strongly supports the life-cycle hypothesis. The eﬀects are in-
signiﬁcant in 1994, however. Also, the coeﬃcient for AP in 1994 is signiﬁ-
cantly positive, which again supports the life cycle hypothesis.
The eﬀects of total ﬁnancial assets are mostly positive and signiﬁcant as
one would expect. However, the marginal eﬀects on AP increased signiﬁ-
cantly from 1990 to 1994 for those in their thirties and ﬁfties. The number
of dependent children (NDEPKID) has a negative eﬀect on personal an-
nuities( A P)f or two age groups, household heads in their thirties and their
forties. The coeﬃcienti ss i gniﬁcant for the latter group in 1990, and for
the former group in 1994. It may be that when parents are younger (and
presumably their children are young), they place a higher priority on in-
vesting in their children rather than preparing for retirement. Also, the
eﬀecto fNDEPKID on LP is signiﬁcantly positive for those in their forties
in 1990. These two observations support the bequest motive. In 1994, how-
ever, all the coeﬃcients for LP become insigniﬁcant. This pattern suggests
that the bequest motive had become negligible by 1994.
Ap ossibler econciliation of these conﬂicting observations is that, faced
with less optimistic future prospects for their children and themselves,
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Fig. 3.1 Marginal eﬀect
parents make a priority of leaving bequests to their heirs by investing in
education,w hich yields a higher return than monetary assets in the long
run. Their second priority is preparing for retirement. To that end, they
purchase personal annuities and trade in their monetary assets. When they
arey ounger, the purchase of AP is more dependent on the level of totalﬁnancial assets and the number of dependent children; the marginal eﬀects
of those two factors are large.
Thel evelo fthe intercept coeﬃcienti tself is not of interest, but its shift
between the two waves reﬂects a uniform adjustment made by the people
within the same age group. The intercept showed a signiﬁcant increase for
the group in their forties in the AP equation, and for those in their thirties
in the LP equation. The marginal eﬀects of other variables on AP are very
stable for people in their forties. This implies that, facing a reduction in
pension beneﬁts, those in their forties raised their private annuity holdings,
regardless of the level of other factors. These adjustments presumably were
made by a compensating reduction in other ﬁnancial assets.
It is diﬃcult to explain all of these results in one simple framework.
However, it seems that household priorities regarding these two objectives,
their own retirement life and the later life of their surviving family mem-
bers, change with both their life stage asset levels and their expectations
for the future. One common pattern suggested by these estimation results
is that a households’ ﬁrst priority is to achieve at least a minimum level of
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Fig. 3.1 (cont.)preparation for retirement and a minimum level of bequests to their heirs.
For that purpose, they are willing to sacriﬁce current consumption.
We also look at changes in total annuity and life insurance demand in
the two waves. The sum of the predicted values of private annuities from
the tobit coeﬃcients and public pensions (AG)m ay be interpreted as “de-
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Fig. 3.1 (cont.)siredt o tal annuity.” The same interpretation applies to life insurance. I
look at the level and shift of these total annuity and life insurance vari-
ables. Table 3.4 and ﬁgure 3.2 present means and standard deviations of
these two variables for six age groups: thirty to thirty-four, thirty-ﬁve to
thirty-nine, and so on, up to ﬁfty-ﬁve to ﬁfty-nine.
As the upper half of ﬁgure 3.2 shows, the mean total annuity increased
in all age groups by 2 million (for those aged ﬁfty-ﬁve to ﬁfty-nine) to 4.5
million yen (for those forty-ﬁve to forty-nine). Younger generations tend
to start accumulating annuities earlier in the 1994 data. Within the 1994
wave, the means of total annuity are fairly stable across age groups, with
ar ange of 2.9 million yen (15.6–18.5 million yen). Variations within and
across age groups are stable, with the standard deviations between 5 and
6 million in both years.
Ac ontrasting picture emerges for total life insurance. The lower half of
ﬁgure 3.2 shows that the means of total life insurance stayed at about the
same level in both years. The variation within each age group, on the other
hand, increased in all age groups, with those aged thirty-ﬁve to thirty-nine
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Fig. 3.1 (cont.)Fig. 3.2 Desired total annuity and life insurance
Table 3.4 Desired Life Insurance and Annuity, by Age Group
1990 1994
Standard Standard
Age Mean Deviation Mean Deviation
Total Annuity
30–34 12.77 6.39 16.72 6.03
35–39 12.91 6.05 17.02 5.37
40–44 14.49 5.66 17.35 6.07
45–49 14.05 5.25 18.52 9.00
50–54 14.18 5.00 16.31 7.98
55–59 13.85 5.76 15.61 5.73
Total Life Insurance
30–34 28.78 8.58 32.35 12.56
35–39 35.31 8.99 33.90 18.36
40–44 35.24 8.82 35.29 11.78
45–49 34.10 9.40 33.86 11.84
50–54 27.72 9.39 29.91 13.79
55–59 26.20 12.91 27.19 15.30
Note: Total annuity is the sum of predicted private annuity and life insurance (million yen).
Total life insurance is the sum of public pension and life insurance (million yen).having the largest variation. As noted earlier, this age group is the ﬁrst
generation of both males and females to begin receiving full pension bene-
ﬁtsb eginning at age sixty-ﬁve. The response to the shift in the public pen-
sion system is more heterogeneous in this age group than in other groups.
3.5 Conclusion
This study examined the relationship between Japanese households’
personal annuity and life insurance choices and the public pension system.
From the two waves of microdata sets obtained in 1990 and 1994, I sepa-
rate pure life insurance and pure annuity from their gross values, and
thereby isolate the saving component of life insurance and personal annu-
ity. The sample period is characterized by declining asset values, a reduc-
tion in public pension beneﬁts, and less optimistic future prospects for the
Japanese economy.
Iﬁ nd that the intended level of total annuities increased by about 4
million yen on average from 1990 to 1994, which more than compensated
forar eduction in public pension beneﬁts. Furthermore, the age proﬁle for
mean total annuities became ﬂatter from 1990 to 1994 across all age
groups because of the younger generation’s early accumulation of personal
annuities. In contrast to total annuities, the mean total of life insurance
stayed quite ﬂat and stable in both periods across age groups, while intra-
generational variations widened to as much as twice their 1990 levels.
One hypothesis to explain this result is that households have a minimum
target level of annuity and bequest. Facing declining beneﬁts from public
pensions and unfavorable future income prospects, individuals begin to
accumulate personal annuities at earlier stages of their lives. To leave a
bequest, it is a rational choice to invest in the asset that yields the highest
return to heirs, namely, education. If parents decide to leave a bequest in
the form of human capital via education, they are constrained during the
period of high educational expenses. Since educational expense is lumpy
in nature, households must reduce their consumption, saving, and life in-
surance purchases during this period, typically beginning in their mid-
thirties and up to their early ﬁfties. Once the minimum level is achieved,
households choose their consumption/wealth accumulation path from a
wider variety of menus.
These results are consistent with Horioka et al.’s (1996) ﬁnding that, in
Japan, the purpose and priority of wealth accumulation (saving) changes
with age and life stage. In particular, the primary purpose of saving among
those in their thirties is education, while for those over forty-ﬁve it is prep-
aration for retirement.
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Japanese Social Security System
This section gives an outline of Japan’s social security system, which
provides public pensions and public life insurance (see Social Insurance
Agency 1995a,b; Shimada 1995 for details). Old-age public pensions pro-
vided by the Japanese system have two parts: the base (ﬁxed) part, and the
remuneration (proportional) part, which is also called the “second ﬂoor.”
Base Part
Theb ase of the system is the National Pension (NP, or Kokumin Nen-
kin). It is compulsory for all individuals aged twenty to sixty. Those who
paid the premium for the NP will receive aﬁ xed annual payment begin-
ning at age sixty in the 1985 system, and beginning between age sixty and
sixty-ﬁve (depending on year of birth) in the 1994 system (see ﬁg. 3A.1).
Beneﬁts from the NP include Old-Age Basic Pension, Survivors’ Basic
Pension, and Disability Basic Pension. The insured person who has paid
the premium for more than twenty-ﬁve years is eligible for Old-Age Basic
Pension beneﬁts. Those who paid the premium for forty years will receive
full beneﬁts: 666,000 yen per year in 1990, and 780,000 yen in 1994. The
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Fig. 3A.1 Transition of social security system (1985–94)Survivors’ Basic Pension beneﬁt depends on family composition and the
age of the widow.
Second Floor
Thep roportional remuneration consists of various employees’ pension
systems. Among those, the Employees’ Pension Insurance system (EPI, or
Ko ¯seiN e nkin) is the most common one in Japan. It covers all employees
in the private sector, excluding only public employees, teachers and em-
ployees of private schools, and seamen. Those insured by EPI pay the
premium according to their remuneration level, and upon reaching their
retirement age (sixty), they receive pension payments based on their pre-
miums. Employees not covered by EPI are covered by mutual aid associ-
ations (MAA, kyo ¯-sai kumiai), which oﬀer similar premium/beneﬁts
schemes as the EPI, to the insured. The premiums for the EPI are deter-
mined on the basis of “standard remuneration,” SR, which is basically
equal to the regular monthly wage and allowance, excluding bonus pay-
ments. The premiums are determined by the SR multiplied by the pre-
scribed ratio.
The beneﬁt levels of the Old-Age Employees’ Pension and the Survivor’s
Employees’ Pension are determined as follows:
Old-Age Employees’ Pension
Average Monthly SR) (1% ~ 0.75%)* (Insured Period in Months),
=
( xx
where x is the indication ratio and the asterisk indicates that the ration
varies by the year of birth.
Survivor’s Employees’ Pension is paid to the surviving family members
when the insured person dies. The pension is 75 percent of the Old-Age
Employees’ Pension, and an additional amount is paid if there are children
under eighteen years old, or if the widow is of advanced age.
Calculation of Public Life Insurance (LG)
The life insurance part of social security (LG)i sdeﬁned as the expected









where SSBt indicates the discounted sum of social security beneﬁt ﬂow
when husband dies at age t (H_AGE). SSBt is obtained under the follow-
ing assumptions:
1. The householder started working at the age indicated in the following
table, and did or will pay social security premiums throughout the employ-
ment period.
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2. The wage proﬁle of the husband before and after the survey, up to
his death, is given by equations from Iwamoto and Furuie (1995), which
were obtained from cross-sectional regressions of the 1990 RADAR data.
3. The SR when the husband dies at age t is the average wage of the
husband before his death multiplied by the factor determined by the ﬁrm
size.
4. The couple will not have additional children after the RADAR
survey.
5. The discount rate is 1/1.05.
6. The indexation factor is 1.01 (1 percent annual growth).
Family Composition
RADAR asked questions on the number of dependent children and the
family’s life stage, but did not ask the ages of the children. In order to
obtain the social security beneﬁts ﬂow for the surviving family members,
I assume that the ages of the children are given by the following table.
Life Stage Description Age of the Eldest Child
3F irst child is born. 3
4F irst child is in elementary school. 9
5F irst child is in junior high school. 14
6F irst child is in high school. 17
7F irst child is in college. 21
8F irst child becomes independent. 25
The age diﬀerence between children is assumed to be two years. If the age
of the youngest child becomes negative by this convention, then the age of
the youngest is set to be zero and all ages are spaced evenly between the
eldest and the youngest.
Life Insurance (LP)
Thef o llowing variables on life insurance are used to calculate the ex-
pected life insurance payment to surviving family members. Note that sur-
vey questionsr egarding the types of insurance held by the household diﬀer
in 1990 and 1994.
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1. Husband’s death insurance payment (LI_H), and the amount of re-
imbursement at maturity (LI_B).
2. Types of insurance purchased by the household. Dummies for:
a. term insurance (D_TI);
b. insurance with maturity and reimbursement (D_MR);
c. insurance with maturity (D_M);
d. whole life–type insurance (D_WL).
1994
1. Husband’s death insurance payment (LI_H), and the amount of re-
imbursement at maturity (LI_HB).
2. Types of insurance which cover husband. Dummies for:
a. term insurance (D_TI);
b. whole life–type insurance (D_H_WL);
c. saving-type insurance (D_H_SV).
As mentioned earlier, life insurance has two functions: pure term and
savings (see ﬁg. 3A.2). To measure the amount of bequest from life insur-
ance, I look at the expected discounted value of life insurance payment,
net of saving. This approach makes it possible to compare beneﬁts from
public life insurance and private life insurance.
Thee xpected life insurance payment to surviving family members is






H_AGE Death Insurance Payment







Fig. 3A.2 Life insurancewhere  is the discount factor, which is set to be 1/1.05. The conditional
probability of death at age t given that the husband is alive at age H_AGE
is calculated from the seventeenth Japanese mortality table, based on the
1990 population census. The summation is taken up to age eighty, because
the conditional death rate is not available for age eighty and over.
Thes a ving component of life insurance at time t is deﬁned as reimburse-
ment for canceling the contract at time t.Iobtain the ﬁgures under the
following assumptions:
1. Household purchased the contract at age thirty.
2. Premium is paid by annual (or monthly) installment.
Calculation of Personal Annuity (AP)
Thef o llowing variables relating to private annuity are available in
RADAR.
1. Dummies for subscriber as husband or wife (multiple answer is pos-
sible).
2. The expected total annual annuity payment upon retirement.
3. Duration of receiving annuity. Dummies for
a. whole life (D_PA_WL);
b. over eleven years (D_PA11);
c. six to ten years (D_PA6_11);
d. ﬁve years or less (D_PA_5) (multiple answer is possible).
The typical personal annuity arrangement is in the following form (see
ﬁg. 3A.3): The contract holder pays a ﬁxed annual installment, d,u n t i lage
T*  1 (typically age ﬁfty-nine or sixty-four). At age T*, he starts receiv-
ing an annuity of A for TAy e a r s .I fh ed i e sb e f o r ea g eT*, his surviving
family receives roughly the amount of total installments paid before his
death. In the case of death during the annuity period, the heir will receive
the remaining balance of the annuity payments during the guarantee pe-
riod, G years. For example, if the husband dies at age t, T*  t  T*  G,
the payment is roughly A(T*  G  t). There is no payment to his heir if
the holder dies after age T*  G. Also, if he cancels the contract before
age T*, reimbursement is paid according to the pre-speciﬁed schedule (see
ﬁg. 3A.3). In the case of cancellation after age T*, the payment is the same
as in the case of death.
Thus the personal annuity contract has three functions: personal annu-
ity, life insurance, and saving (cancellation value). The total ﬁgure of per-
sonal annuity receipt of the household is in the questionnaire, but other
information about husband’s annuity, such as amount of coverage for the
husband, age of the person when the contract was signed, (T0), age when
the person starts receiving the annuity (T*), period of receipt (TA), or the
guaranteed period (G), are not available.
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ityﬂ ow,a nd the life insurance under the following assumptions:
1. Personal annuity contract started when the husband was age thirty
(T0  30).
2. Premium is paid by annual (or monthly) installment.
3. Husband will start receiving annuity at age sixty (T*  60).
4. There are three types of personal annuity: ten-year guarantee/whole
life (G  10, TA  ∞); ﬁve-year ﬁxed (G  TA  5); and ten-year ﬁxed
(G  TA  10).
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